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Abstract— In this paper, we propose a novel power analysis 
attack resilient adiabatic logic which, unlike existing secure 
adiabatic logic designs doesn’t require any charge sharing 
between the output nodes of the gates. The proposed logic also 
removes the non-adiabatic losses (NAL) during the evaluation 
phase of the power-clock. We investigate and compare our 
proposed and the existing secure adiabatic logic across a range of 
“power-clock” frequencies on the basis of percentage Normalized 
Energy Deviation (%NED), percentage Normalized Standard 
Deviation(%NSD) and average energy dissipation. The pre-
layout and post-layout simulation results show that our proposed 
logic exhibits the least value of %NED and %NSD in comparison 
to the existing secure adiabatic logic designs at the frequency 
ranging from 1MHz to 100MHz. Also, our proposed logic 
consumes the lowest energy. 
Keywords—power analysis attacks resilient; secure adiabatic 
logic;  charge sharing; energy consumption; countermeasure 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The Power Analysis Attacks (PAA) [1] attacks have 
received the most attention in recent years.  In PAA, the 
adversary attempts to reveal secret information such as secret 
key, on the basis of the cryptographic device’s power 
consumption during the execution of the critical operations 
such as encryption and decryption. The strength of the PAA 
comes from the fact that the power consumption of the 
cryptographic device depends on the intermediate values 
processed in it. Therefore, if the power consumption of the 
cryptographic device can be made independent of the 
intermediate values, the PAA can be made difficult. There are 
various countermeasures that have been proposed in the 
literature [2]-[10] to protect cryptographic implementations and 
are employed at the algorithmic level, architecture level, and 
cell (gate) level. Hiding [2] and masking [3] are amongst the 
most common countermeasures at cell level.  
There are several papers that have addressed the design of 
PAA resilient logic designs such as Sense-Amplifier-Based 
Logic, SABL [2], Wave Dynamic Differential Logic, WDDL 
[4], Masked Dual-rail Pre-charge Logic (MDPL) [5], Three-
phase Dual-rail pre-charged logic (TDPL) [6]. All these logic 
designs applied conventional CMOS logic operation and thus 
dissipate high energy.  
On the other hand, there are several, energy efficient PAA 
resilient logic designs based on the adiabatic logic [7] such as 
Charge-Sharing Symmetric Adiabatic logic, CSSAL [8]. 
Symmetric Adiabatic Logic, SyAL [9], and Secure Quasi-
Adiabatic Logic, SQAL [10]. SyAL and SQAL are based on 
Efficient Charge Recovery Logic, ECRL [11]. SyAL and 
SQAL differ only in the number of charge-sharing transistors 
used. CSSAL on the other hand, is based on 2N-2N2P 
adiabatic logic [12] and is an enhancement of SyAL adiabatic 
logic. These existing adiabatic logic designs suffer from several 
shortcomings which will be discussed in section II. Section III, 
proposes, a novel PAA resilient adiabatic logic. Next, 
simulation results are presented in section IV where we 
investigate and compare our proposed and the existing secure 
adiabatic across a range of “power-clock” frequencies on the 
basis of % NED, % NSD, average energy dissipation. Also, a 
GF (2
4
) bit-parallel multiplier design is presented as a design 
example to evaluate and compare the performance of the 
proposed and the existing adiabatic logic. Finally, a conclusion 
is formulated. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS  IN THE EXISTING SECURE 
ADIABATIC LOGIC DESIGNS  
The existing PAA resistant logic has number of 
shortcomings. Firstly, all the logic designs use charge-sharing 
technique at the output/internal nodes of the gate to avoid 
dependency on the previous input transition. Apart from charge 
sharing, CS, inputs, CSSAL also uses an evaluation input. For 
working in cascade logic, the existing logic designs require 4-
phase power-clocking scheme thus, incurs the overhead of 
generation, scheduling and routing of the 4-phases of the CS 
and evaluation input.  Our proposed logic requires no 
additional inputs and thus saves this overhead. 
 Secondly, the existing logic designs suffer from Non-
Adiabatic Losses (NAL) both in evaluation and recovery phase 
of the power-clock. Because the proposed logic uses dual 
evaluation network one connected between the power-clock 
and the output nodes and another connected between the output 
nodes and the ground thus, completely removes the NAL in the 
evaluation phase of the power-clock.  
Thirdly, the existing logic gates are asymmetric. Fig. 1 (a), 
and (b) shows the AND/NAND gates and their equivalent RC 
models of the internal nodes during the evaluation phase for 
SyAL and CSSAL respectively. It can be observed that there is 
asymmetry in the gates. In none of the 4 input combinations, 
the same value of capacitance is charged at the two output 
nodes. The proposed logic charge the same capacitance value 




   (b) 
Fig. 1. Equivalent RC models of (a) SyAL AND/NAND [9] (b) CSSAL 
AND/NAND[8] gate during evaluation phase for 4 input combinations.  
Lastly, the existing logic designs have been assessed for 
their resistance against PAA using the inputs which do not 
follow the adiabatic principle [8]. Also the inputs used are the 
one which will not come out of an adiabatic circuit. Fig. 2 (a) 
and (b) shows the 16 input transitions for 2-input gate as shown 
in [8] and the real life relevant adiabatic input transitions 
respectively. The problem with the input transitions of Fig 2(a) 
is that it favours the energy efficiency of the logic by removing 
the coupling effects and the NAL during the recovery phase of 
the power-clock. Simulation results show that there is an 
improvement of about 11%, 12.5%, 13.5% and 37% in the 
average energy dissipation of AND/NAND gate using CSSAL, 
SAQL, SyAL and the proposed logic respectively at 10MHz. 
There is a large improvement of average energy dissipation for 
the proposed logic because the input stays ‘high’ and stable 
even during the recovery phase of the power-clock thus, allows 
the full recovery of charge from the power-clock. This results 





Fig. 2. 16 input transitions for 2-input gates (a) as given in [8] (b) real life 
relevent adiabatic input transistions. 
III. PROPOSED POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK RESILIENT 
ADIABATIC LOGIC WITHOUT CHARGE-SHARING 
The idea of charge-sharing is to prepare the circuit for the 
evaluation of the next inputs by removing the remaining charge 
(due to non-adiabatic loss of the quasi-adiabatic logic) from the 
output nodes to avoid the data dependent initial condition 
which depends on the previous inputs.  For removing the left 
over charge, charge-sharing transistors are used during the idle 
phase of the power-clock, before the evaluation of the next 
input take place. The NOT/BUF gate for SQAL and SyAL has 
the same structure and is shown in Fig 3(a). During the idle 
phase of the power-clock, when input A is rising transistor, N1 
turns ON, and drives the output node ‘Outb’ to zero. As the 
charge-sharing transistor, N3, is also turned ON, it connects the 
output node, ‘Out’ to ground through transistor, N1. This way, 
both the output nodes are discharged to ground before the 
evaluation of the next inputs. The CSSAL NOT/BUF gate 
shown in Fig. 3 (b) uses an additional evaluation input apart 
from the charge-sharing transistors. The evaluation signal 
increases simultaneously with the input signal. The 
capacitances at the two output nodes are discharged to the 
ground before the logic function is evaluated.  
         
       (a)         (b) 
Fig. 3. (a) SyAL/SQAL NOT/BUF [9],[10] schematic (b) CSSAL NOT/BUF 
[8] schematic. 
We have proposed a novel PAA resilient adiabatic logic 
which does not require any charge-sharing between output 
nodes of the gates for discharging the output nodes to ground. 
Fig. 4(a) shows a NOT/BUF gate using the proposed logic. It 
uses dual evaluation network which helps both the output 
nodes to discharge to ground during the idle phase of the 
power-clock. It can be observed that during the idle phase of 
the power-clock when input A is rising transistors N3 and N6 
are turned ON. Because the power-clock is at zero voltage 
during the idle phase, the output node ‘Out’ follows the power-
clock and makes it zero. Similarly, transistor N6 causes the 
output node ‘Outb’ to discharge to zero and thus no charge 
sharing is required. Fig. 4 (b) shows the layout for the 
NOT/BUF gate. 
Fig. 5(a) and (b) shows the schematic and the equivalent RC 
models of the internal nodes of the proposed AND/NAND gate 
for 4 input combinations during the evaluation phase.  It can be 
seen that for each input combination the same capacitance 
value is charged. The schematics of the OR/NOR, 
XOR/XNOR gates using proposed logic, were implemented in 
the similar way as the AND/NAND gate. 
      
        (a)                 (b) 
Fig. 4. Proposed power analysis attack resilient NOT/BUF gate (a) 
Schematic (b) Layout. 
 
                             (a)                        (b) 
Fig. 5. Proposed power analysis attack resilient AND/NAND gate (a) 
Schematic (b) Equivalent RC model in evaluation phase.   
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Simulations were performed in ‘typical-typical’ process 
corner using TSMC 180nm CMOS process at 1.8V power 
supply. The load capacitance was chosen as 10fF and the 
transistor sizes for all the designs were set at the technology 
minimum (Wmin=Wn=Wp=220nm, Lmin=Ln=Lp=180nm). The 
pre-layout simulations were performed at frequencies 1MHz, 
10MHz and 100MHz and the energy dissipation per cycle for 
all possible input transitions for NOT/BUF and 2-input gates 
were measured for existing and the proposed logic.  
The pre-layout simulation results are summarised in Table 
I. To quantify the resistance of the proposed and the existing 
logic designs, we measured the maximum energy value (Emax), 
minimum energy value (Emin), the average energy value (Eav), 
and the standard deviation (σ) for all the possible input 
transitions for NOT/BUF and 2-input gates. From these values, 
we obtained the Normalised Energy Deviation (NED) and 
Normalised Standard Deviation (NSD), according to (1) and 
(2). 
The Normalised Energy Deviation (NED) is defined as:  
    maxminmax EEENED     (1) 
 Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) [12] is defined as:  
               
avENSD          (2) 
Where, Eav is the average energy dissipation for all 16 input 
transitions, and Standard Deviation is defined as:  
                  nEEEn
i avi   1
2
       (3) 
Table I shows that the proposed logic exhibits the least 
value of %NED and %NSD at all simulated frequencies. It also 
shows that at 1MHz, the energy consumption of the 2-input 
gates using proposed logic is greater than SQAL and SyAL and 
is comparable to CSSAL. However, SQAL, SyAL and CSSAL 
suffers from NAL during the evaluation and recovery phase of 
the power-clock whereas, the proposed logic suffers from NAL 
only during the recovery phase.  
At low frequencies, the energy dissipation of the adiabatic 
logic in general is dominated by leakage energy rather than 
Adiabatic Losses (AL) and NAL. Thus, the proposed logic 
having more transistors than SQAL and SyAL dissipates more 
energy. CSSAL on the other hand, has 19 transistors and has 
higher NAL thus, consumes more energy than the proposed 
logic. Also, NAL of CSSAL is higher compared to SQAL and 
SyAL, because it has 2 stacked transistors, one connected 
between the input and the ground and the other connected 
between the power-clock and the cross-coupled pMOS 
transistors P1 and P2 as shown in Fig. 3 (b).   
AL dominates at higher frequencies rather than leakage 
loss. Thus, at 10 MHz and 100 MHz AL combined with NAL 
leads to large energy dissipation in CSSAL, SQAL and SyAL 
compared to the proposed logic as can be seen from Table I. It 
also shows that on the basis of %NED and %NSD, the 
performance of SQAL, SyAL and CSSAL changes with 
frequency. At 1MHz and 100MHz, CSSAL is second best 
followed by SyAL and SQAL, whereas, at 10 MHz, SyAL is 
second best and is followed by CSSAL and SQAL. Thus, the 
ranking of performance (security level) of the existing logic is 
frequency dependent. The proposed logic outperforms the 
existing secure adiabatic logic at all simulated frequencies.  
Galois field (GF) arithmetic plays an important role in 
cryptography algorithms. To evaluate the performance of the 
proposed logic a GF (2
4
) bit-parallel multiplier was 
implemented. For comparison, CSSAL, SQAL and SyAL 
versions were also implemented. The simulations were 
performed under the same conditions as for the gates. The % 
NED and % NSD were calculated for 15 random inputs at all 
simulated frequencies.  
 
TABLE I.PRE-LAYOUT SIMULATION RESULTS COMPARING THE %NED OF  NOT/BUF AND 2-INPUT GATES USING CSSAL, SQAL, SYAL AND PROPOSED LOGIC. 
Logic designs 
CSSAL[8] SQAL[10] SyAL[9] Proposed  












































































































































































































Table I shows that the GF (2
4
) multiplier results confirms 
those repetition from the pre-layout and post-layout simulation 
results of the gates. 
The full-custom layouts were drawn using Cadence Virtuoso™ 
layout editor. The post-layout simulations were carried out for 
each of the existing and proposed logic designs. The layouts 
for all the gates were drawn keeping the symmetry and output 
node load balancing in mind. The post-layout simulation 
results shows the similar trend as shown by the schematics 
except that the %NED and %NSD are large for each of the 
proposed and the existing designs compared to their 
corresponding %NED and %NSD in pre-layout simulation 
results. The proposed logic outperforms the existing secure 
adiabatic logic at all simulated frequencies.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel power analysis 
attack resilient adiabatic logic which does not require any 
charge-sharing between the output nodes of the gate. The 
proposed logic completely removes the non-adiabatic losses 
during the evaluation phase of the power-clock. The full-
custom layouts were drawn for the proposed and the existing 
adiabatic logic.  The pre-layout and post-layout simulation 
results show that our proposed logic shows less variation in % 
NED and % NSD with frequency variations compared to 
existing adiabatic logic.  Also our proposed logic exhibits the 
least value of the % NED and % NSD at all simulated 
frequencies. These results were confirmed by using GF (2
4
) 
bit-parallel multiplier as a candidate circuit for comparison. 
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